Court Case

What the court has decided

On February 9, 2026, the court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment on Count VIII, respondeat superior, and Count IX, statutory indemnification. It identified factual disputes requiring a jury’s assessment.

The opinion applied three considerations: whether the conduct was of the kind Mostek was employed to perform; whether it occurred substantially within authorized time and place; and whether it was motivated, at least partly, by a purpose to serve her employer.

The court discussed CPD’s responsibilities concerning threats posed by animals, the treatment of Mostek following the shooting, the incident’s location within Chicago, and her statements about acting in a police capacity. It also considered the City’s arguments that her conduct and motivation were personal. Off-duty status alone, the court explained, did not decide the issue.

Denial of summary judgment preserved the dispute for further proceedings. It did not establish either defendant’s liability or finally determine scope of employment. Read the opinion, ECF 153, pp. 25–28.

Registration, qualification, and scope of employment

Plaintiff’s summary-judgment response identifies registration of Mostek’s off-duty firearm and CPD’s annual qualification requirements as evidence relevant to the employment relationship. The brief argues that use of an off-duty firearm did not make her conduct that of a private civilian. Read Plaintiff’s argument, ECF 112, p. 6 and footnote 5.

The COPA interview presents a separate compliance issue. During the May 24, 2024 interview, investigators identified August 10, 2022 as her last recorded qualification with the Sig Sauer P365. Mostek supplied no reason to doubt that record or believe she had qualified afterward. When confronted with the allegation of failing to qualify annually under CPD Uniform and Property Order U04-02, she said she had forgotten and agreed that she did not believe she had qualified. This exchange concerns a lapse in annual qualification; it does not establish that she attempted and failed a proficiency test. Read the interview excerpts, original pp. 55–56 and 72–76, particularly 72:9–73:6 and 76:11–19.

Registration does not itself establish current qualification. Conversely, failure to comply with a departmental qualification requirement does not, by itself, determine whether an officer acted outside the scope of employment. In Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., the Illinois Supreme Court explained that forbidden conduct can remain within the scope of employment, while recognizing that an employer’s prohibition may still be relevant to that inquiry. These questions should be considered separately when evaluating the parties’ arguments. The February 9, 2026 ruling preserved the scope dispute for further proceedings; it did not finally determine scope or either defendant’s liability. Read Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d 154 (2007), opinion pp. 9–10; ECF 153, pp. 25–28.

Why compensatory and punitive damages must be distinguished

Compensatory damages address legally recoverable injury and loss. Section 9-102 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act directs local public entities to pay covered compensatory judgments or settlements arising from employees’ conduct within the scope of employment. The February opinion identifies scope as a necessary element of the two City-directed claims it considered.

The City’s position therefore seeks to avoid financial responsibility through those claims even if Mostek is found liable. Whether that position succeeds remains a separate question from whether her conduct was unlawful. 745 ILCS 10/9-102.

Punitive damages serve a different purpose. Section 2-302 prohibits a local public entity from electing to indemnify an employee for the punitive portion of a judgment. The November 2024 opinion dismissed the request for punitive damages against the City. A finding that Mostek acted within her employment would not, by itself, make a punitive award indemnifiable. 745 ILCS 10/2-302; ECF 49, p. 21.

Separate questions about police authority and representation

The court expressly distinguished acting “under color of state law,” relevant to the federal civil-rights claim, from acting within the scope of employment under Illinois law. Its discussion does not make either concept interchangeable with lawful conduct. ECF 49, p. 20.

Providing a legal defense is also distinct from accepting responsibility for a judgment. In its September 2024 reply, the City disclosed that it had undertaken Mostek’s representation under a reservation of rights, preserving its ability to dispute indemnification. That documented arrangement helps explain how the defendants can share an interest in defeating the claims while taking conflicting positions about who would pay an adverse judgment. It does not, by itself, establish improper conduct by either defendant’s lawyers. Sources: ECF 40, pp. 2–3; ECF 40-1, June 4, 2024 reservation-of-rights letter (residential street address redacted).